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NOTES AND COMMENT
in which one or more of such defendants reside.26 The jurisdiction of
justices of the peace, in all civil actions, except as provided in the pre-
ceding section, shall be coextensive with the limits ok the county
seems a much stronger limitation of jurisdiction than "An action
against a corporation may be brought "27 But the Supreme
Court did not so interpret it.
It is submitted that an affirmance of the decision of the Superior
Court, that a rural justice of the peace has no jurisdiction over an
inhabitant of a city of more than three thousand inhabitants, would
have been more in accord with the intent of the Legislature.
H. C. Force.
CONTRACTS NOT To BE PERFORMED WITHIN A YEAR UNDER
STATUTE OF FRAuDs IN WASHINGTON-The statute of frauds in
Washington,1 states that in certain specified cases an agreement, con-
tract and promise shall be void unless the same or some note or
memorandum thereof be in writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith. By subdivision I this provision extends to every
agreement that by its terms is not to be performed in one year from
the making thereof. Two recent decisions of our Supreme Court have
gone into an extended interpretation of this subdivision regarding two
troublesome questions of law arising thereunder.
The first of these questions is: What is the test for determining
whether the oral agreement by its terms is not to be performed within
one year from the making thereof?
In the case of Tonkoff v. Roche Fruit & Produce Co.,2 a contract
was entered into on November 28, 1922, by the terms of which
appellant was to dispose of respondent's 1923 crop of apples for the
agreed compensation of fifteen cents per box. The respondent con-
tended that the contract was void for the reason that it was not to be
performed within one year from the making thereof. The case was
reversed, and the Court answered respondent's contention by stating-
"The contract was made on November 28, 1922, and fixes no time
for its performance, and the court cannot say that all its terms could
not have been complied with prior to November 28, 1923. It is quite
possible that the performance could be entirely made within that time,
and it is of no consequence that the appellant and the respondent may
have been of the opinion that the contract might extend beyond the
year, or that, as a matter of fact, it did so extend.
"The true test is not what the parties expected or what actually hap-
pened, but whether the contract by its terms must endure longer than
the year."
Rem. Comp. Stat., §§ 1756-7, P C., §§ 9559-60.
=Rem. Comp. Stat, § 206; P C., § 8543.Rem. Comp. Stat., § 5825; P C., § 7745.
2137 Wash. 148, .42 Pac. 3 (1926).
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The case of In re Field's Estate, cited in the above decision, dealt
with the question of an oral agreement whereby an administrator
waived the statutory fees allowed him, as being within subdivision I
of the statute of frauds, an agreement not to be performed within one
year. The Court held that the agreement was outside the statute, that
the contract might have been fully performed within a year, that the
administrator might have died, resigned or have been removed. The
Court said in part:
"It has been well established by authority that the test is not what
the parties expected the duration of the contract would be, but whether
of necessity it must be of such duration."
From the Tonkoff case, supra, reinforced by In re Field's Estate,
supra, we can safely lay down the rule that an oral agreement, contract
or promise is outside of subdivision I of the statute of frauds unless by
its terms it must endure longer than a year. If there is a possibility
or a contingency whereby performance may take place within a year,
the agreement, contract or promise is outside of subdivision I of the
statute. Furthermore, it is immaterial (1) what the intention of the
parties was, except as expressed in the terms of the contract itself, and
(2) that the contract did in fact extend over a year.
The second question is: Will part performance take an oral agree-
ment, contract or promise, which by its terms can not be performed
within a year, outside of the statute of frauds?
In the case of Hendry v. Bird,4 the defendant agreed with plaintiff
to buy 51% of the capital stock of a corporation for the use of the
plaintiff and defendant, and it was further agreed that the plaintiff
should pay him for one half of said stock in the sum of $3,000 to be
paid in installments of $50 each, payable every month from July, 1917,
to July, 1922, the plaintiff's share of the stock to be turned over to him
when the last payment was made. The stock was purchased, and
plaintiff fully performed his part of the contract by paying the $3,000
in monthly installments. The defendant refused to deliver to plaintiff
his share of the stock. The trial court granted the prayer of the com-
plaint and compelled the defendants to perform the contract by delivery
of the stock. It is to be noted that here a full performance had been
made by one of the parties. The Supreme Court reversed the case,
holding that the contract was void as being within the statute of frauds,
and that part performance did not take it outside the statute. The
Court cited in support of its holding the case of Union Savings & Trust
Co. v. Krumm.5 In that case a contract was entered into to cut and
deliver logs for a period of two years. The respondent insisted that
there was such a part performance as to take the contract out of the
statute of frauds. The Court, however, refused to follow the respond-
ent's contention, modified the trial court's decision, and stated the rule
to be as follows:
333 Wash. 63, 73 Pac. 768 (1903).
'135 Wash. 174, 240 Pac. 565 (1925).
188 Wash. 20, 152 Pac. 681 (1915).
NOTES AND COMMENT
"The doctrine of part performance, however, has no application to
this clause of the statute of frauds. In the nature of the case, where
the statute is directed solely to the time of performance and not to the
character or subject matter of the contract, part performance could
not remove the ban of the statute without in effect repealing the
statute."
In the Hendry case, supra, the Court also reasoned by analogy by
reference to the case of Keith v. Smith.8 This case construed another
subdivision of the statute of frauds, the agreement therein mentioned
likewise being void unless in writing. The suit in the Keith case, supra,
was to recover a commission on the purchase of real estate by oral
contract. The Court stated that from its very nature a claim for com-
mission could not be made until earned, and to hold that the perform-
ance would take an action of this character out of the operation of the
statute would nullify the statute itself. In the Hendry case, supra,
the Court also referred to the case of Chamberlain v. Abrams,8 which
case construed Rem. Comp. Stats., §§ 10550, 10551, P C., §§ 1909,
1910, providing "that all conveyances of real estate or any interest
therein, and all contracts creating or evidencing any encumbrance upon
real estate shall be by deed."
The above statutes do not declare that oral agreements with reference
to the conveyances or incumbrance of real estate shall be void, yet in the
Chamberlain case, supra, the Court held that the payment of the pur-
chase price, either in whole or in part, was not a sufficient part per-
formance of an oral agreement to convey lands to take the agreement
out of the statute of frauds.
There are several earlier Washington decisions which at first sight
appear to be in conflict with the Hendry case, supra, on the subject of
part performance of contracts not to be performed within a year, which
should be noted here.
The case of In re Field's Estate, supra, not only held that an oral
agreement whereby an administrator waived the statutory fees allowed
administrators was not void since it could be performed within a year,
but also held that even assuming the contract was within the statute, by
accepting the office there was a part performance and the administrator
was estopped to allege its invalidity. The case, in so far as it is based on
the second ground, unless distinguishable by the nature of part per-
formance, is overruled by Hendry v. Bird, supra. In the Field's Estate
case performance was possible within a year, while in the Hendry case
it was not. Therefore, we may regard the second ground for the de-
cision in the Field's Estate case as mere dicta and distinguish the two
cases on their facts.
In the case of Borrow v. Borrow,' appellant advanced $1,800 for
premises purchased by her parents, taking a deed in her own name,
under an oral agreement whereby the parents agreed to repay the
046 Wash. 131, 89 Pac. 473 (1907).
'See note 1, supra.
836 Wash. 587, 79 Pac. 204 (1905).
134 Wash. 684, 76 Pae. 305 (1904).
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purchase price within two years, with $15 per month as compensation
for the loan. The parents made improvements on the property and
paid interest on the loan, and sought specific performance on payment
of the purchase price. Appellant contended that the oral agreement
was void as not to be performed within one year. The case was
affirmed on the ground that the trust relation existing and part per-
formance defeated the claim that the agreement was oral and therefore
void as not to be performed within a year. The agreement could have
been performed within a year, since by its terms payment of the $1,800
could have been made at any time within two years and so was outside
of the statute, but the Court did not decide that question. In this case
respondents paid interest, entered upon the premises and made improve-
ments thereon. It is a stronger case of part performance than the
Hendry case, supra. But, nevertheless, in so far as the decision in the
Borrow case, supra, is based on part performance, it would seem to be
overruled by the Hendry case. It is to be noted, however, that no
mention of the Borrow decision was made by the Court in deciding the
Hendry case.
The case of Maze v. Feuchtwanger '0 dealt with an. agreement to
pay a commission on a sale of goods in consideration of the agent's
release of an option permitting a sale to another. The Court held
that the agreement was not within the statute of frauds, since per-
formance was possible within a year because no time was fixed, especially
where it was fully executed on the part of the promisee. The Court's
contention of part performance is mere dicta, and the dicta would seem,
at first sight, overruled by the Hendry case, supra. However, it is to be
noted that in the Hendry case neither party could have or did perform
his part of the contract within a year; while in the Maze case, supra,
assuming that the commission was not to be paid within a year, the
promisee could have and did fully perform within the year.
In conclusion, it is to be repeated that the case of Hendry v. Bird,
supra, is a clear and convincing decision, to the effect that where an
oral agreement, contract or promise is void by reason of the fact that
it may not by its terms be performed within one year from the making
thereof, part performance will not take it outside of the statute.
J. Orrin Vining.
THE "BUT FOR" RULE IN WASHINGTON-The question of proxi-
mate cause is one which is of vital importance in determining where
the liability for an act or omission shall fall. For this reason certain
attempts have been made to set forth rules which should determine
whether an act was the proximate cause of a particular result. The so-
called "But For" rule for determining proximate cause is an outgrowth
of this class of litigation and has been the cause of several interesting
and apparently none too well reasoned cases, of which the famous "Bear
Case" or Gilman v. Noyes' is perhaps the best known.
" 106 Wash. 327, 179 Pae. 850 (1919).
'Gilmann v. Noyes, 57 N. H. 697 (1876).
